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How Do You Solve a Problem Like Induction? 
Flip a Coin, Twice if Needed 
 
 
In 1777 David Hume propounded a problem so pervasive, seemingly simple yet difficult to 
solve that it altered the course of philosophy.1  
 
We can never learn from the past how the future will be, Hume suggested, for we have 
experienced only events unexceptionally conjoined – events, that is, with no evident 
'causal connection' between them – and thus have no warrant to expect them to remain 
conjoined in the future. Why then do we act confidently upon the inductions that we 
make? Hume's answer was unequivocal: because we are constrained by custom (or 
habit) to do so, lack of reasons notwithstanding: 
 
All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object 
present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between that 
and some other object; or, in other words, having found, in many instances, that 
any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been 
conjoined together: if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind 
is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality 
does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the 
necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of 
the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, 
when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these 
operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of 
the thought, and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.2 
 
The logic of Hume's problem of induction, as Popper would afterwards insist, is one of 
universal instantiation and only derivatively of singular predication, commonplace 
suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding.3 To ask whether we are justified in 
                                                     
1 The recollection of Hume's problem awoke Immanuel Kant from a "dogmatic slumber", 
as he put it, provoking him over a dozen years of pondering to construct his Critique of Pure 
Reason (with the 'Transcendental Analytic' at its core) that was in turn to inform every literate 
philosopher thereafter. For the remembrance, see the concluding paragraphs of the 
"Introduction" to his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783 as translated by Paul 
Carus (Chicago, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1902 [Third Edition, 1912]). 
2 From Part I of Section 5: "Skeptical Solutions of These Doubts" of Hume's "An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding"(1748, 1777) as reprinted in David Hume: On Human Nature 
and the Understanding, edited with a new introduction by Antony Flew (New York, New York: 
Collier Books, 1962), page 61.  
3 See, for example, Popper's essay "Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem 
of Induction" (reprinted in Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach (1972). 
Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press. pages 1-31.). Queries such as 'Will the book on my desk, 
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believing that the conclusion of an induction will prove true, or even to act as if it were 
so, is to ask whether we are justified in believing that, or acting as if, a sentence, 
universal in scope, hypothetical in form and without evident counterexamples, is true. 
The question, as Hume put it, is whether a "constant conjunction" will remain constant 
in the future. 
 
Consider, then, the next object c that we shall encounter that satisfies a predicate F, if 
any there be, and a sentence (L) encompassing the predicates F and G to which no 
counterexamples have been observed. 
 
(L) (x) (Fx only if Gx) 
 
The problem of induction with respect to (L) has two facets, one epistemological, the 
other pragmatical.  
 
The epistemological problem is whether we are warranted in believing that (L) is true.4 
Hume argued famously that the answer is 'no', for the absence of evident 
counterexamples fails to preclude one or another of them from lurking as yet 
undisclosed somewhere within the universe. If we do in fact believe it, our belief, 
however natural and common, is unwarranted. 
 
Let's assume that Hume was right: the epistemological problem of induction has no 
solution.5 What, then, of its pragmatical counterpart? Absent evident counterexamples, 
may we with warrant presume to act as if (L) is true when encountering c? Hume, 
convinced that only justified beliefs can warrant actions, would have said 'no'. Were we 
to presume that we could, upon encountering c, act with reason as if (L) is true, our 
presumption, however natural and commonplace, would be equally unwarranted.  
 
I believe, however, that Hume, though right with respect to the epistemological 
problem of induction, was wrong with respect to its pragmatical counterpart – wrong 
with respect to the second, indeed, because he was right with respect to the first.  
                                                     
heretofore heavy, be so tomorrow?' beg, trivialise or render unintelligible the questions upon 
which the puzzle rests, for if I may with warrant presume that the book of today will tomorrow 
be the same book, I may with equal warrant assume that it will be heavy as well. 
4 I should for exactness add here and hereafter as appropriate the phrase 'or probably 
true'. For brevity, however, I omit it, commending readers to read 'is true' as if modified 
accordingly.  
5 Though I shall presume within this talk that Hume was right, I remain respectful of the 
contrary convictions of Kant and of my teacher, Donald Williams. See his The Ground of 
Induction (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963). That, however, is matter for discussion on 
another occasion.  
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We are justified in preparing to act as if (L) is true because we are 
unjustified in believing it to be so. 
 
How so? Consider our options for preparing to act upon encountering c. 
 
 
Our Options for Acting 
 
If Hume is right with respect to the epistemology of induction, we lack sufficient 
evidence to conclude either that that (L) is true or that some object is a counterexample 
to it.6 We must nevertheless be prepared, upon encountering c, to act one way or the 
other. We can rationally do no better, therefore, than flip an unbiased coin and prepare 
to act accordingly. 
 
If the toss shows heads, prepare to act as if (L) is true;  
 
If the toss shows tails, prepare to act as if some object is a counterexample to it. 
 
With the 1:1 odds between options, we might appear by flipping the coin to be only 
treading water rather than advancing toward warrant for preparing to act as if Gc.  
 
A single toss of the coin, however, might well fail to conclude the game. How so?  
Were the tossed coin to show heads, no further playing would be required of us: we are 
to prepare to act as if (L) is true – as if, that is, Gc. If, however, the tossed coin were to 
show tails, obliging us to prepare to act as if some object is a counterexample to (L), we 
should have two options open to us rather than one.    
 
We could opt to prepare to act as if c were a counterexample to (L); or  
 
                                                     
6 [Note added 22 April 2019] When this essay was presented in 1980, I had as yet to 
learn that the predicate 'is false' ought to be avoided, for it lacks definition (unlike, after Tarski, 
the predicate 'is true'). [See, for example, the essay "Filmmaking, Logic and the Historical 
Reconstruction of the World" within the 'Philosophical Enquiries' sub-section of the 'Evan Wm. 
Cameron Collection' of YorkSpace, the 'Institutional Repository' of the Library of York University. 
[https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/35778] Consequently, I referred within 
the presentation to (L) as being 'false' rather than as having 'some object' as 'a counterexample'. 
Within this revision, I have for precision amended phrases accordingly but without change of 
substance. 
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We could with equal consistency opt to prepare to act instead as if Gc, for, 
though obliged by the toss of the coin to act as if some object is a 
counterexample to (L), the counterexample might be an object other than c. 
  
Presuming with Hume that no evidence can assist us in making the choice, we can do no 
better than flip our coin a second time and yet again prepare to act accordingly. 
 
If the second toss shows heads, prepare to act as if c will be a counterexample to 
(L). 
 
If the second toss shows tails, prepare to act as if some object other than c is a 
counterexample to (L) (to act, that is, as Gc).  
 
In summary, we can proceed no more rationally when preparing to encounter c than to 
flip an unbiased coin and, if needed, do so again. 
 
If the first toss shows heads, prepare to act as if (L) is true (to act, that is, 
as if Gc). 
 
If, instead, the first toss shows tails, flip the coin again! 
 
If the second toss shows heads, prepare to act as if c is a counterexample 
to (L). 
 
If the second toss shows tails, prepare to act as if some object other than 
c is a counterexample to it (to act, that is, as if Gc). 
 
 
The Remarkable Consequence 
 
The option of tossing the coin a second time may appear once again to have gotten us 
no closer to the goal of acting with warrant as if (L) is true. Upon closer examination, 
however, the option has shifted the odds of the outcome of the game dramatically from 
1:1 to 3:1, for one of the ways of acting in response to the second toss of the coin is 
equivalent to acting as if (L) is true. 
 
To prepare to act as if some object other than c is a counterexample to (L) is to 
prepare to act as if Gc! – as if, that is, (L) is true. 
 
When acting as rationally as possible, therefore, the odds of acting as if (L) is true 
are identical to the odds of acting as if Gc – namely 3:1. 
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Preparing to act as if Gc is more rational than preparing to act as if c will be a 
counterexample to (L), for were we to act in accordance with the tosses of an unbiased 
coin, we should with odds of 3:1 prepare to act as if Gc. Preparing to act as if Gc, 
however, is equivalent to acting as if (L) is true.  
 
Given our options for preparing to encounter c, therefore, it is more rational by 
odds of 3:1 to act as if (L) is true than to prepare to act as if c will be a 
counterexample to it. 
 
Had we a coin known to be unbiased, therefore, and were we by tossing it to decide 
how to prepare to act when encountering c in a manner 'than which no more rational 
can be conceived' while respecting Hume's insistence that we can never know (L) to be 
true), we ought to act – with odds of 3:1 – as if (L) were true. 
 
What is the relevance of all of this to the problem of induction in the 'real' world – the 
world within which decisions must be made without recourse to tosses of unbiased coins? 
Decisively this:  
 
Were we, before encountering c, to act as if (L) is true, we should be acting in 
accordance with the most rational choice that we could have made – the choice that 
tossing an unbiased coin would have determined for us with odds of 3:1, were such 
coins available.  
 
Were we instead to prepare to act as if c would be a counterexample to (L),  we 
should be acting with lesser odds (1:3) contrary to the most rational choice that we 
could have made.  
 
The moral is clear:  
 
If we wish to act as rationally as possibly, we ought to act as 
if (L) is true. 
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Conclusion 
 
We have now solved the pragmatical problem of induction. Recall the question? 
 
Are we justified in acting as if (L) is true? 
 
The logic of the problem of induction compels us to decide whether we should act as if 
(L) is true or that some object is a counterexample to it. Had we an unbiased coin to toss 
(twice if needed), we could with odds of 3:1 confirm that we ought to act as if (L) were 
true. Having no unbiased coins but wishing to act most rationally, we ought therefore to 
act as nearly as possible in accordance with those odds. 
 
We ought, that is, to act as if (L) is true. 
 
As a postscript, let me dissolve an objection to the above argument that might at first 
glance prove distracting. 
  
Objection: 'You have construed the options on the tosses of a coin in one way, 
but there are others less advantageous. Suppose, for example, one were instead 
to subsume the options of acting with respect to (L) as twofold under a single 
toss rather than fourfold under two of them. 
 
If the toss shows heads, prepare to act as if Gc (as if, that is, either (L) is 
true or some object other than c is a counterexample to it). 
  
If the toss shows tails, prepare to act as if c is a counterexample to (L). 
 
This procedure is as effective as your own and respects equally Hume's claim 
that we can never know (L) to be true, but the odds of acting as if (L) is true 
(preparing to act, that is, as if Gc) are now no better than 1:1. Given such 
alternative construals, we have no warrant to prefer your own.' 
 
The pragmatic response to this complaint is straight-forward. One may choose to act in 
accordance with any procedure with respect to (L) that is effective and conforms equally 
with Hume's prohibition. The one that I have proposed, however, is the only one known 
to me that solves the pragmatic problem of induction! 
 
Absent an argument to its impotence, therefore, one ought – pragmatically 
speaking! – to act upon it rather than others, for its explanatory power is 
unmatched. 
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The pragmatic problem of induction is solvable because the epistemological problem 
has no solution. Who, then, needs an epistemological solution? We, contra Hume, can 
distinguish rational action with respect to the future without it, and rational action 
coincides with our behaving in accordance with our best-tested scientific conjectures.  
 
Who could ask for anything more? 
 
 
